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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
NORTH TEMPLE INVESTMENT
CORPORATION, BLAINE J.
PALFREYMAN, and LARUE
PALFREYMAN, his wife,
Plaintiffs and Respondents.
vs.

Case No.
12247

SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION, a body politic, and SALT
LAKE COUN,TY, a body corporate
and politic,
and Appellants.

APPELLANTS' BRIEF
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE
OF THE CASE
The respondents brought this action to quiet title
to the property within a subdivision known and designated on the official records of the Salt Lake County
Recorder, State of Utah, as "Fritch and Zulch's First
1

Addition to Salt Lake City" and to have the subdivision
declared to be abandoned and have all streets and alleys
designated for public use declared to be cancelled an<l
vacated.
DISPOSITION OF THE CASE
IN THE LO,VER COURT

The lower court granted the respondents' Motion
for Summary Judgment and held the title to Fritch and ·
Zulch's First Addition to Salt Lake City to be quieted
in the respondents; and that appellant be enjoined, debarred, and restrained from asserting any claim or interest whatsoever in or to the said land, or any part thereof; and that the subdivision was declared to be abandoned, vacated, null and void, and of no force and effect;
and the streets and alleys and any portion of said subdivision designated for public use was cancelled and ·
vacated.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

The appellant seeks (I) a reversal of the summary ,
judgment to the respondents by the lower court, and (2)
a ruling by this court that the appellant is entitled to ,
summary judgment.
STATEMENT OF FACTS

The facts in this case are not in dispute. The plat of ,
Fritch and Zulch's First Addition to Salt Lake City was
2

recor<led on December 18, 1889, in the office of the
County Recorder of Salt Lake County, Territory of
Ctah, as Entry no 13579, Book B, Page 97, Official
Records, Salt Lake County, Territory of Utah. A portion of said subdivision lies within the corporate limits
of Salt Lake City and this portion only is the subject
matter of this appeal. Since the recordation of said official plat, none of the streets, alleyways, or other portions of said subdivision designated for public use has
been developed or used as streets and alleyways. The
respondents have also not developed the subdivision in
any manner and have not put the property to any use
which would be inconsistent with the rights of Salt Lake
City regarding said streets, alleyways and other portions
of said subdivision designated for public use nor for
which purpose they were dedicated.

STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I
STREETS AND ALLEYWAYS, ONCE DEDICATED BY FILING OF A PLAT, REMAIN AS
STREETSANDALLEYWAYSANDARENOT
ABANDONED BY MERE NONUSE.
POINT II
THE STATUTE 'VHICH RESPONDENTS RELIED UPON IN THEIR CLAIM THAT THE
SUBDIYISION 'VAS ABANDONED, SECTION
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2070, C.L.U. 1888, DOES NOT APPLY
CORPORATED CITIES; THUS THE
COURT ERRED IN GRANTING RE
ENTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUD
BASED UPON THIS STATUTE.

ARGUMENT
POINT I

STREETS AND ALLEY,VAYS, ONCJ
CATED BY FILING OF A PLAT, REM
STREETS AND ALLEYWAYS AN
NOT ABANDONED BY MERE NONU

In 1889, when this subdivision was recc
statute which was the controlling means for a c
of streets and alleys to public purpose, read a

"Roads, streets, alleys and bridges lai1
recorded by order of the county courts
cipal corporations within their respec1
dictions, are public highways." Sect
C.L.U. 1888.

Thus, the laying out and recording of a pla1
municipal corporation causes the roads, streE
and bridges designated thereon to become pu
ways.

In the case at bar, the plat of Fritch ar
First Addition to Salt Lake City was laid out \
and streets designated thereon and said plat w

4

e<l December 18, 1889. All provisions required by the
statute were complied with; hence, there is no question
tliat the streets and alleys within the Fritch and Zulch's
First Addition to Salt Lake City have been dedicated
to the public use.
Once streets and alleys are dedicated to public use,
there are only four methods of releasing property from
such dedication, which are, (I) statutory, ( 2) vacating,
( 3) aban<lomnent, and ( 4) impossibility of use for the
purpose dedicated. Since Salt Lake City has not vacated
the streets an<l alleys, and since there has been no occurrence which would render the purpose impossible, the
only methods of releasing the property from said dedication which would remain in question are statutory
abandonment or actual abandonment by Salt Lake City.
Statutory abandonment is discussed in Point II. Therefore, only actual abandonment will be discussed here.
l\Iere nonuse, or a mere lapse of time, or adverse
possession will not destroy the public right to use of
streets and alleys which have been dedicated to the public use. See, Dunlap v. Tift, 209 Ga. 201, 71 S.E.2d 237
( 1952) ; Robinson v. Korns, 250 Mo. 663, 157 S.W. 790
( 1913) . This is especially true where streets and alleys
are concerned, because the muncipality has a discretion
as to the time for opening and a discretion as to when
the necessity for public use arises. See, Sowadzki v. Salt
Lake County, 36 Utah 127, 104 P. Ill (1909); Griffin
v. Ola-6fte, 44 Kan. 342, 24 P. 470, ( 1890); Killam v.
Multnomah County, 137 Ore. 562, 4 P.2d 323 (1931).
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said:

In the Griffin v. Olathe case, the court, as page 474,
"Until the time arives when any street or part
of a street is required for actual public use, and
when the public authorities may be properly
called upon to open it for public use, no mere
user of any length of time will operate as an abandonment of it, and all persons in possession of it
will be presumed to hold subject to the paramount right of the public." (Emphasis added.)

In the Sowadzki case, which is a Utah case, the
court said:
" ... in case the statute has substantially been
complied with, dedication is complete, and no
formal acceptance by the public is necessary, and
that the streets so dedicated may be opened at any
time after such dedication when necessary for
public use, and that a failure to open them until
such time will not be deemed an abandonment
thereof." (Emphasis added.) Sowadzki v. Salt
Lake County, supra, at page 113.
Further, the court stated:
" ... that, when so dedicated, the streets, alleys,
and public places retain their public oharacter
until vacated in the manner prescribed by law, or
until abandoned ... " (Emphasis added.) Sowadzki v. Salt Lake County, supra, at page 114.
An abandonment does not result from mere nonuse. Swope v. Kansas City, Kansas, 132 F.2d 788
( 1942); Coffin v. Portland, 27 F. 412 ( 1886). Likewise,
abandonment will not result from mere failure of the
6

city to exercise control or supervision over the dedicated
streets and alleyways. Interstate
Steel Co. v. East
Chicago, 187 Ind. 506, 118 N .E. 958 ( 1918); City of
Henderson v. Yeaman, 169 Ky. 503, 184 S.W. 878
( 1916). Even 30 years delay in opening streets and alleys was not by itself enough to show an abandonment,
and the city was not estopped from opening them. Jefferson v. Eiffler, 16 Wis. 2d 123, 113 N.W.2d 834
( 1962). The court, in the case of City of Henderson v.
Yeaman, supra, stated at page 882:
"\Vhen streets are set apart and dedicated to
the public use ... the city authorities are not required to take physical possession or control of
each street, or to improve it in order to save their
right."
Further, at page 882, the court observed:
"The city may delay manifesting its acceptance
by control and improvement as long as it pleases.
It may wait until the needs of the public or the
city may required improving."
The court said that, if mere delay would work an
abandonment of dedicated streets and alleys, this would
deprive the public of valuable property rights. This is
stated in the following language found at page 882:

"If mere nonuse by the public or failure on the
part of city authorities to take some affirmative
action ... would work an abandonment of it for
the purposes for wh.ich it was dedicated . : . it
might deprive the city as well as the public of
valuable property."

7

In City of Jefferson v. Eiffler, it was stated at page
839, thusly:
"Negligence and unreasonable delay by themselves are not sufficient to constitute abandonment, other extenuating circumstances must be
shown."
At page 839, the court stated:
"The public use is the dominant interest an<l
the public authorities are the exclusive judges
when and to what extent the street shall be improved. Courts can interfere only in cases of
fraud or oppression, constituting manifest abuse
of discretion."
'
The court said that there must be some affirmative
action taken by the city in order for an abandonment to
be effectuated. The fact that there must be an affirmative act before an abandonment will result was substantiated in the following cases: Village of Newport v.
Taylor, 225 Minn. 299, 30 N .W. 2d 588 ( 1948) ; Bitney
v. Grim, 73 Ore. 257, 144 P. 490 (1914). In Skrmetta v.
Moore, 227 Miss. 119, 86 So. 2d 46 ( 1956), the court
said there must be an unequivocal act showing clear intent to abandon the streets and alleys and that payment
of taxes by the property owner was not a sufficient act
to work an abandonment when the streets and alleys are
dedicated to the public use. Partial enclosure and occupancy of highway under a claim of right was also not
sufficient. Jersey City v. Morris Canal <% Banking Co.,
12 N.J. Eq. 547.
There is no showing in the case at bar that any un-
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equivocal act on the part of the city or the respondent
has taken place which would work an abandonment.
POINT II
THE STATUTE WHICH RESPONDENTS RELIED UPON IN THEIR CLAIM THAT THE
SUBDIVISION WAS ABANDONED, SECTION
2070, C.L.U. 1888, DOES NOT APPLY TO INCORPORATED CITIES; THUS, THE LOWER
COURT ERRED IN GRANTING RESPONDENTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
BASED UPON THIS STATUTE.
The method provided by the Legislature for dedicating highways to public use at the time the land in
question was so dedicated was Chapter XIII, C.L.U.
1888, Section 2068, which states as follows:
"Roads, streets, alleys and bridges laid out and
recorded by order of the county courts or municipal corporations within their respective jurisdictions, are public highways."
The section relied upon by respondent for his proposition that there has been an abandonment by statute is
• Chapter XIII, C.L.U., Section 2070, which provides:
"A road not worked or used for a period of five
years ceases to be a highway."
It should be noted that Section 2070 states only

that a "road" not worked or used for five years ceases
to be a highway. It does not say a street or an alley

9

not worked or used for five years ceases to be a highway.
Section 2070 also does not state that a highway not
worked or used for five years ceases to be a highway.
If the Legislature had intended that dedicated streets
and alleys be abandoned if not worked or used for five
years, they would have used the language as they did
in all other sections, "roads, streets, alleys, and bridges.'
See Sections 2065, 2066, 2067 and 2068. Since they did
not, the Legislature's intention was that only roads
not worked or used for five years are considered as
abandoned. The term "road" has a distinct and separate
meaning in the statute, or it would not be used. The
question of what the Legislature intended by the word
"road" is the real issue here. The term "road" is ordi.
narily applied to a free public way in the county. See,
Parsons v. Wright, 223 N.C. 520, 27 S.E.2d 534 (1943);
Mushbaugh v. East Peoria, 260 Ill. 27, 102 N.E. 1027
( 1913). It is submitted that this is the meaning which
the Legislature gave to the term when it enacted Chapter XIII, C.L.U., 1888. This court has consistently
held that each word in a statute must be given meaning
and that construction is favored which will render every
word operative rather than meaningless. Stevenson v.
Salt Lake City, 7 U.2d 28, 317 P .2d 597 ( 1957) ; Metropolitan Water District v. Salt Lake City, 14 U.2d 171,
380 P.2d 721 (1963).
The term "street" strictly speaking, refers to a
public thoroughfare in an urban community such as a
city, town or village. Duval County v. Jacksonville, 36
Fla. 196, 18 So. 339 ( 1895) ; Karb v. Bellingham, 61
10

Wash. 2d 214, 377 P.2d 984 (1963); Carlin v. Chicago,
2ti2 Ill. 564, 104 N.E. 905 (1914). The term "street"
is not ordinarily applicable to roads and highways outside municipalities. Mont9omery v. Santa Ana Westminst,er R. Co., 104 Cal. 186, 37 P. 786 (1894); Wooster
v. Arbenz, 116 Ohio St. 281, 156 N.E. 210, 52 A.L.R.
518 (1927).
Respondent has cited no case where a court has
applied the language of Section 2070, nor any similar
language, to property within an incorporated city and
held that huch language would work an abandonment
on dedicated streets and alleys within such incorporated
city. Appellant has also found no case where such has
been held. Many states have statutes with this same
language or similar language. All cases where they
declared an abandonment were cases where the property
was not within an incorporated city and in many cases
the court stated that such language applied only to roads
or highways which are in the county. Examples os some
of these cases are: Myers v. Daubenbiss, 84 Cal. 1, 23
P. 1027 (1890); Sowadzki v. Salt Lake County, supra;
Mallory v. Taggart, (Utah Supreme Court, 1970), 470
P.2d 254.
On the other hand, in all cases found where the
property was within an incorporated city, the court held
that they were not abandoned because the statute applied only to roads or highways in the county. Examples
of some of the cases are: Plaine Lumber Co. v. City
of Oshko5'h, 89 \Vis. 449 61 N.W. 1108 (1895); Lake
11

Shore and M. S. Ry. Co. v. Town of Whiting, 161 ind.
80, 67 N.E. 933 (1903); Baltimore 0 & C. R. Co. v.
Town of Whiting, 30 Ind. 182, 65 N .E. 759, ( 1902);
The James McDonough, 200 F. 556 (1912); Laclede.

Christy Clay Products Co. v. City of St. Louis, 246
Mo. 446, 151 S.W. 460 (1912); Evans v. Andres, 226
Mo.App. 63, 42 S.,V.2d 32 (1931); Odom v. Hook,
(Mo. App., 1943), 177 S.W.2d 165.

The S owadzki case and the Mallory case were
decided on a later statute, Section 1116, R.S.U. 1898,
which statute added the language, "all highways once
established must continue to be highways until abandoned by order of the board of county commissioners
of the county in which they are situated, by operation
of law, or by judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction; provided, . . . " then, the section included the
language of Section 2070, U.C.L. 1888, "a road not
used or worked for a period of five years ceases to be
a highway."
The language of the amendment clarified what was
means by "road" in that it referred to the County Commissioners of the county in which they are situated. The
court in S owadzki used this language along with other
statutes to show that the intent of the Legislature was
that a road is a county road and not city streets and
alleys. The court at page 115, stated:
"We fully agree with counsel for
that the sections we have referred to were not m·
tended to and do not apply to streets in incorpo·
rated cities and towns in this state, but we cannot
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agree with them that those sections do not apply
to dedicated roads and highways as well as to
roads that were established by any other method
known to the law. The reasons why these sections
do not apply t.o city or town streets are to our
minds reasonably clear. It will be observed that
section 1116 refers to all highways over which the
board of county commissioners has jurisdiction.
While it does not so state in terms, it nevertheless
directly refers to the commissioners of the county
in which the highways are situated, and says nothing about highways or streets which are exclusively under the control of city or town authorities.
In this state we have no village organization, but
are limited to cities and towns, which are divided
into classes. Hy subdivision 8 of section 206, and
again in section 255, Comp. Laws of 1907, authority and discretion to establish, vacate, and
control city: and town streets, alleys, and public
places are expressly vested in the city and town
councils, while in subdivision 24 and 27 of
551 such power, control, and discretion are vested
in the county commissioners over all highways
'within the county outside of incorporated
cities.' " (Emphasis added.)
There are specific reasons why streets and alleys
, in a city should not be deemed abandoned in such a short
time as five years as was indicated by the court when
it said that these reasons were reasonably clear in their
minds. A city grows much faster and develops subdivisions to a much greater extent than does a county.
' The need for a uniform system of streets is greater
in the city than in a county and the likelihood that a
platted and recorded subdivision will become an actual
subdivision is greater within a city than in the outlying
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districts of a county. A subdivision, laid out and recorded, which is in the county and has much less chance of
becoming an actual subdivision if it is not developed
within five years than does one within a city. For these
reasons it is reasonable to call for an abandonment of
a county roads if they are not developed within five years,
but a city should be allowed a longer period to develop
streets. It is the contention here that the Legislature
has always treated streets and county roads as being
different and governed by different provisions. The
court in Sowadzki case, supra, at page 115, stated:
"We have referred to these things for the purpose only of showing that the Legislature has always treated streets as being controlled by dif f erent provisions than those which affect county
highways. In view of these provisions, and others
which require no special mention, we are of the
opinion that the Legislature intended that streets
in cities and towns should be governed by a diff erent rule with regard to the abandonment
thereof than are roads and highways in the county
outside of such cities and
(Emphasis
added.)
In view of the foregoing authorities, it is submitted that the statute does not apply to streets and
alleys in incorporated cities; therefore, that this court
should reverse the ruling of the lower court and direct
that appellant be granted judgment in accordance therewith.
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CONCLUSION
The streets and alleys within the Fritch and Zulch' s
First Addition to Salt Lake City have not been abandoned by the city; therefore, the lower court erred in
granting the respondents' Motion for Summary J udgment.
Respectfully submitted,
JACK L. CRELLIN
CITY ATTORNEY

By····················································
0. Wallace Earl
Assistant City Attorney
101 City and County Building

Salt Lake City, Utah
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